For just four months since November 1, 2009, presidential bet Manuel Villar is reported to have spent P1.3 billion for political ads alone. The amount almost matches what four other leading aspirants have spent over the same period, added together. That’s a huge amount by any measure just to put his campaign message across, project an image, get the voters to recall his name, and more.
Villar has used the PhP1.3 billion largely for TV and radio ads, which lend themselves to easy monitoring. Over and above this are other expenditures that will bloat the total to an amount no one will ever know exactly what.
Galang is a fellow of Action for Economic Reform and specializes in governance issues. This is a two-part column, published in the BusinessWorld. Part 1 came out on March 15, 2010, pages S1/4 to S1/5. Part 2 was published on March 16, page S1/5.
For just four months since November 1, 2009, presidential bet ManuelVillar is reported to have spent P1.3 billion for political ads alone.The amount almost matches what four other leading aspirants have spentover the same period, added together. That’s a huge amount by anymeasure just to put his campaign message across, project an image, getthe voters to recall his name, and more.
Villar has used the PhP1.3 billion largely for TV and radio ads, whichlend themselves to easy monitoring. Over and above this are otherexpenditures that will bloat the total to an amount no one will everknow exactly what.
The ad buys leave out of account the spending for allowances ofcampaign leaders or coordinators, “volunteers,” etc., and for buildingor maintaining campaign organization or network, operations andfacilities. The items here enjoy a higher degree of opacity, tendingto hide from view the actual amount spent.
If you don’t believe that Villar’s big-time allies have agreed tosupport his bid out of deep love for him or adherence to his patrioticbelief, if any – you must be one of those skeptical souls who suggestthat either pesos or promises or both have been given and forthwithreceived. No contract is ever signed, no official receipt everissued. No such deal ever happened, to begin with. But the amountinvolved is surely big.
Money, big money, has taken a key role in Villar’s bid since the startof activities and up to now. The choice lies apparently in abundance.He admits he needs the extra amount to make up for what he lacks, likea famous father and mother, a good name, a sister in show business, andso on.
Hoping to turn his affluent campaign into a virtue for voters, Villarsays the money is his own anyway. Were it otherwise, he would bebeholden to contributors to whom he must return the favor when he winsthe coveted post. In business terms, it is not a corporate thing, onlya single proprietorship – ergo, all returns shall accrue to him alone?
Having a steady supply of money isn’t enough to make a mark. So giveVillar credit for his wiles, or savvy, in using his billions wisely.Otherwise, go find other reasons to explain his improved performance inthe surveys. You probably had found the same traits wanting in thepresidential bids of Eduardo Cojuangco and Jose de Venecia some yearsback (or, on second thought, may be there was too much of wiles ontheir part to keep money from flowing generously).
What Villar, the NP candidate, really reminds me of is the NPreelectionist in the 1969 presidential race. Ferdinand Marcos hadfunded his campaign on so massive a scale, unheard of until then in thehistory of Philippine elections, that the event left the economyquivering from a crisis. No elections before 1969 were as dirty,costly, and fraudulent.
Only in 2004 were elections dirtier, costlier, and more fraudulent. Atthe rate Villar is spending for his campaign, 2010 may just as well seta new record of its own. So far, like in a beauty pageant, the currentelectoral activities, reports say, have already earned for 2010 thetitle “The Costliest” elections so far. Meanwhile, the campaign will goon for about two months more.
As Election Day draws nearer, the need for campaign cash ironicallygrows bigger too. The main focus shifts from broadcasting to“narrowcasting.” Broadcasting spreads the candidate’s message to abroad audience via mass media, where TV has become the logical favoriteby virtue of ubiquity. It aims for the buy-in.
Narrowcasting, on the other hand, works to conclude the sale and ensurethe actual buy. The branded item is the candidate, the currency is thevote, by analogy. Campaign strategists often refer to this as the“translation of popularity into votes.” This is the scheme of things asyou see it on the surface.
Lying below that is its seamy side. If your aim is to lock the actualbuy, a tried and tested way awaits you. Money is the currency, the votebecomes the item for sale. The candidate no longer appears as a mirrorof the voter’s values. He appears instead as mere buyer who faces thevoter as mere seller. Money morphs into a mirror of the vote’s(exchange) value. In plain English, I don’t care if the candidate iswrong; I care only if the price is right.
Campaign operators normally refer to this and its attendant activitiesas “Special Operations” (a.k.a. Dirty Tactics). They work on theassumption that money is never an issue. In the current contest, onlyVillar seems able to take this assumption as his own without any worry.
Special ops aim to strengthen and broaden your network of operators andactive supporters, especially at the subnational levels down tobarangay. And what better way of doing this than raiding youropponent’s machinery, thus undermining its operations at the same time?
A tell tale sign is in this recent news item reporting about some “300Liberal Party stalwarts and members in three key provinces in theCaraga region” defecting allegedly to the Nacionalista Party. Thereport cites Villar as saying that “he expects more defections not onlyfrom the LP but also from other parties as the May presidentialelection nears.” That is ominous.
Special operations also yield political intelligence reports andanalyses, to know, for example, who to approach, the subject’s profile,the issues involved, the right price, and the like. A good operatordeals flexibly, preferring to see things in shades of gray. Ifconscience or other constraints keep a local LP leader, for example,from defecting or openly supporting Villar, the table is laid open forother options – from, say, undercover work to simple distribution of NPsample ballots come E-day (while holding the LP’s from distribution).
Special ops spare no one, not even the big national figures. SenatorsJuan Ponce Enrile and Richard Gordon, along with presidential betJoseph Estrada, share a common story about separate bribe offersimplicating Villar, who quickly dismissed the accusations as“politically motivated.”
For maximum effect, timing is key to successful special ops. Peoplegunning for local posts who find themselves running out of gas whilethe race approaches the homestretch are likely to bite the offer if nosupport is forthcoming from his or her own party.
The Philippine presidency is no doubt the juiciest post that anybusinessman would find worth gunning for at all cost. When Marcos wonhis bid for reelection in 1969, nobody thought that early that hisliking for the highest post would extend beyond the additional fouryears that he had just won. With the benefit of hindsight, however,you’ll find good reason why Marcos needed to win his reelection in thecostly way he did. After all, he was looking beyond four years andcontemplating holding on to power in perpetuity.
What’s with Villar’s vision to warrant the billions that he has beenspending merrily to get the presidency? Nobody can read his mind andshare what he sees: nobody knows for now.I only know what I can see. And, like Caesar referring to Cassius in Shakespeare’s play, I see a “hungry look.”
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