The author is a visiting scholar of Waseda University and associate professor (on sabbatical leave) at De La Salle University. Email: batallae@dlsu.edu.ph
Certain opinions are misplaced regarding certain types of people and their capacity for decision making and implementation. At least from the point of view of some “accomplished” individuals in business and government, there is a tendency to underestimate, on a wholesale-basis, people from the academe.
Academics are downgraded for their lack of direct or practical experience in public policy and management. From the point of view of a non-partisan observer, the question boils down to whether experienced or inexperienced individuals possess the right knowledge and the capability (including the politics) to apply them in the process of governing the economy or sectors of society.
Four years ago, at De La Salle-Manila, I was given the opportunity to teach a graduate course on Japanese economy. While preparing for the course, I stumbled upon a book on contemporary Japanese economy and economic policy. The book was clear and concise. Well written in English, it could be appreciated even by people who took some economics courses or by economists whose training is “on the fringe.”
The next time I encountered the name of Heizo Takenaka, he had become a member of the Koizumi cabinet, as Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy. An academic most of his life (in his younger years, he had one-year stints at a bank and in a Ministry of Finance research unit), Takenaka found himself at the center of an economy struggling against serious post-bubble economy problems. Prices were going down (deflation), there was a ballooning budget deficit, the amounts of nonperforming assets continued to increase as bankruptcies mounted, the financial industry was very fragile, and unemployment reached its record high throwing more than half a million people jobless.
These and many more confronted the guy from the academe. I have seen him on television and in the newspapers, saw him get criticized and denounced by politicians and others for his structural reforms.
Takenaka firmly believed that structural reforms, whose implementation had been delayed since the mid-1980s, were necessary for the revival of the Japanese economy. The reforms were designed to increase competitiveness in the domestic economy as well as improve government regulation and efficiency. Takenaka courageously took the challenge. He later assumed the task of cleaning up the bad-debt problem and of supervising the financial sector.
On February 18, for the first time in thirteen and a half years, the news reported a real GDP growth of 1.7% for the October-December quarter of 2003. This translated to an annualized growth of 7 percent. A strong export performance had stimulated investments in equipment and other capital goods. As well, the banking sector showed signs of recovery. Other economists were equally optimistic of the steady recovery of the Japanese economy. Although the story is far from over as structural reforms have not yet been fully implemented, it shows that the value of an academic in the formation and implementation of public policy cannot be underestimated.
Thus is fulfilled an old Chinese saying: “Excel in public office and learn. Excel in learning and assume public office.”
A review of Japanese postwar economic history would reveal names of academics revered for their special contributions to economic recovery and then rapid growth. They served prime ministers coming from the Liberal Democratic Party who had little knowledge of economics. In the United States, academics have been valued for their advice. During the Kennedy administration, the president took in as advisers economics professors such as Walter Heller, James Tobin (who later won a Nobel Prize in economics), and Kermit Gordon (who became head of the Brookings Institution). In the United Kingdom, Tony Blair sought the advice of political sociologist Anthony Giddens, who is noted for his works on the Third Way.
These lead to the second point: a president with little knowledge of economics or the social sciences can be aided by a more knowledgeable team of advisers, including those who come from the academe. A condition toward success, as pointed out by other observers, is the degree of cooperation among advisers, and their working relationship with the president.
The third point is that the right policy advice coming from either experienced or knowledgeable professionals can be ineffective if the ultimate executive decision reflects the influence of vested or personal interests. In the Philippines, there is a long list of highly respected academics and experienced professionals whose creditable work were frustrated by political decisions that favored vested interests. Whether the technocrats (the professional administrators) or the rent-seekers (those who gain wealth by obtaining favorable policies and actions from government) brought down the economy may still be debated. To be sure, however, policy decisions need to attend to the greater good and those decisions cannot come from the rent-seekers.
In relation, the fourth point is that no matter how good the policy advisers are, or how sincere the national leader is, the ultimate policy decision depends on the leader’s capacity to decide. This involves processing complex, conflicting, and even incomplete sets of information and advice. It also involves deciding over clashing passions and interests. The alternative to direct decision making is, of course, delegation. Even then, the president is not excused from making decisions. Situations arise, and often do, calling for leadership decision. These require not only experience but knowledge on the part of the national leader, who in the end is accountable to the people.
The fifth point is that the right policy advice does not always come exclusively from the policy advisers themselves. They could come from people from all walks of life. The problems of mass poverty, crime, corruption, and environmental degradation are the cumulative result of unattended problems.
Although these outcomes may be unintended, the lack of attention given to them reflects the arrogance of wealth and power in refusing other people from participating in the governing process. Poor people are left to care for themselves.
The sixth and final point goes beyond knowledge and experience. Taking the right policy or course of action often requires courage. People of policy should have the courage to stand up for what is right and against what is wrong. This is something that appears wanting in Philippine government.
There is something wrong in the idea that public service or policy advice is the exclusive domain of certain types of people. It is true that much is expected of leaders in terms of qualifications and ability. To lead the country calls for experience, knowledge, and courage. However, to look down on the abilities of other people to help government is a disturbing thought.
At the end of the day, one is judged by history for his or her contributions and not by endowments per se. People may have knowledge or experience but it is their contribution to society that is the ultimate measure of their worth. To courageously participate in the task of building good government and society would perhaps be the best commentary on one’s ability in public service.
In ending, there is a story of a new official who asked Confucius about governing. Confucius answered, “Start with the officials and official duties, pardon minor faults, elevate the virtuous and talented.” And the official asked again, “How am I to know the talented and the virtuous to elevate them?” To which Confucius said, “Elevate those you know. As to those you don’t know, would others deny them?”
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