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Action for Economic Reforms

THE WAGES OF CORRUPTION AND THE CORRUPTION OF WAGES

The author is the dean of the College of Business and Economics of De La Salle University.


The Gospel according to Luke (10:7) says: “The worker is worth his wage.”

But consider a pair of identical twins who go to the same schools, take

the same courses, and end up working in the same company. If one twin

is stationed, say, at the London office, he is likely to receive a

higher compensation package than his brother who reports to the Manila

office – even if they are assigned to the same job cell.


If the Gospel speaks the truth, why are workers who are identical in all things except office affiliation paid differently?


Ask a labor economist and chances are you will get an earful on (a) the

demand for labor being a derived demand, (b) the elasticity of

substitution of labor and other inputs and their relative prices, (c)

differences in reservation wages of workers and in their marginal rates

of substitution between goods and leisure, and (d) the relative

configurations of the market labor demand and supply curves and the

wage elasticities of labor demand and supply. (Readers who want a more

detailed exposition of these concepts can consult standard labor

economics texts, such as Borjas, Labor Economics; Brue, MacPherson, and

McConnell, Contemporary Labor Economics; and Ehrenberg and Smith,

Modern Labor Economics: Theory and Policy.)


These models argue that: (a) The demand for labor stems from its

contribution to the production process. The higher the demand for the

final product, the higher the demand for labor. (b) Technology – the

feasible ways of combining inputs into outputs – and the input price

ratios determine the intensity with which production factors are used.


The easier it is to replace labor with other inputs and the more

expensive the wage rate is relative to the prices of other inputs, the

lower will be the labor intensity of the production process. (c)

Workers weigh the trade-off between consuming goods and enjoying

leisure. The higher a worker’s reservation wage (the wage that will

entice him to join the labor force), the less likely he will want to

work and the higher will be the wage required to induce him to work.

(d) The higher labor’s market demand curve, the lower is its market

supply curve, or the higher the absolute values of the wage

elasticities of demand and supply (or responsiveness of wages to unit

changes in hours worked), the lower will be the market clearing wage

rates.


Applying these models to the analysis of differences in wages between

Manila and London, one comes up with the following story: In both

places, workers are paid wages equivalent to their contributions (at

the margin) to profits, so the Bible passage is true in some sense. But

the London-based worker is paid much higher than his Manila counterpart

because the marginal value of his contribution is higher. The reasons

for this differential include: (a) the generally stronger demand for

goods and services in London than in Manila, which implies that the

demand for labor is higher in London; (b) the rising elasticity of

substitution of labor relative to other inputs (The Woody Allen joke

here goes, “After 20 years of working in the same company, my father

was retired and replaced by a gadget. When my mother heard about it,

she immediately went out and bought one.”), which effects a declining

demand for unskilled labor and rising compensation for skilled labor;

and (c) the more rapid downshift in Manila’s labor supply curve due to

unabated population growth.


My problem with this storyline, however, is that it is unsatisfying

from a policy standpoint. Blaming low wages on weak demand for goods

and services and on runaway population growth effectively absolves

policy makers from acting on the problem, since the first reason can be

due to many things, including lack of incomes, high prices, lack of

access to markets, lack of information, and shocks from other economies

or the natural environment (e.g., El Nino dry spells), and the second

reason is politically touchy, given the Catholic Church’s long-standing

opposition to artificial birth control.


So let me offer an alternative explanation, one based on the circular

flow of incomes and goods and the distribution of factor incomes. One

of the simplest models in macroeconomics, the circular flow of incomes

and goods holds that the economy consists of households and firms.

Households own all factor inputs, which they rent out to firms to earn

incomes. Firms hire the factor inputs to produce goods and services,

which they sell to households.


Using the circular flow model, one can think of firms’ activities as

generating an economy’s pie of goods and services. The same model also

explains how this pie is divided up among households. The allocation

rule is simply that a household’s share of the economic pie depends on

the proportionate amount of utilized production factors that the

household owns. The more labor services, land and capital a household

owns which are used in the production process, the greater is that

household’s share of the economic pie.


There are two important points about the economic pie and how it is

divided. One, the allocation rule must specify the relative weights of

the different assets employed in terms of their claims on the economic

pie. In other words, the rule must state how much of the pie one

man-hour of labor (or one machine-hour or one land-hour) is worth. In a

market economy, these weights are wage rates for labor, rental rates

for land areas and buildings, and interest rates for physical and

financial capital. Two, the size of the pie determines the actual

rather than just proportionate value of each slice. (Think of a single-

and a family-size pizza divided, say, eight ways. While each slice is

one-eighth of the pie it comes from, the slice from the family-size pie

is bigger than that of the single-size.)


How does this model answer the question at hand? Since the economic

pies of developed countries are much bigger than those of developing

countries, their workers receive much bigger slices, even if in

proportionate terms the slices (or weights) for labor may be the same

in all countries.


The significance of this insight, however, is that it yields a narrow

and focused agenda for economic managers of developing economies: Grow

the pie, so there is more to spread around.


Unfortunately, on this criterion, the Philippine record is dismal.

Since the 1980s, the economy has never exhibited an annual growth rate

of six percent or more. At an average annual growth rate of six

percent, the economy takes 12 years to double the pie; at four percent,

it takes 17 years.


One reason why the Philippine economy has not grown as fast as other

countries in the region is the rampant graft and corruption that has

persisted through two People Power uprisings. Corruption confiscates a

chunk of the pie before it is distributed. This leaves less for owners

of employed factors to share among themselves, which kills their

incentive to put their resources to productive use. The wages of

corruption in a society that tolerates it are the debasement of wages

and incentives, which in turn stunts the growth of the country’s

economic pie.

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