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  • Action for Economic Reforms

POLICY OF ACCOMMODATION IN MAYNILAD UNDERCUTS FISCAL RECOVERY

Mr. Malaluan is a trustee of Action for Economic Reforms as well as partner at the Quevedo, Malaluan & Lumba Law Offices. This article was published in the Yellow Pad column of Business World, 20 September 2004 edition.


From zero deficit in the year 2000, the Metropolitan Waterworks and

Sewerage System (MWSS) began to post deficits of P3.0 billion, P2.6

billion, P3.2 billion, and P4.5 billion for the years 2001, 2002, 2003,

and 2004, respectively. The singular reason for this reversal was

Maynilad’s refusal to pay concession fees beginning March 2001.

Intended for the main part to service MWSS’s mostly dollar-denominated

debts, the non-payment of concession fees has constrained the MWSS and

the national government to advance the payment for the loans,

contributing significantly to the deterioration of the public sector’s

fiscal position.


This situation dragged on through a combination of legal maneuvers on

the part of Maynilad and a policy of accommodation on the part of

government. Maynilad issued a Force Majeure Notice in March 2001 to

provide a basis for stopping payment of concession fees, culminating in

the serving of notice to MWSS of Early Termination of the Concession

Agreement on 9 December 2002. This forced MWSS to initiate an

arbitration process that took almost one year to resolve. On 7 November

2003, the arbitration award was handed down, declaring that there was

neither a Concessionaire nor MWSS Event of Termination, and that the

Concession Agreement shall remain in force. It ruled further that the

concession fees that should have been paid by Maynilad according to the

Concession Agreement are due and payable. But instead of complying with

the arbitral award, Maynilad pre-empted its execution by filing on 13

November 2003 a Petition for Rehabilitation with Prayer for Suspension

of Actions and Proceedings Against Petitioner before the Regional Trial

Court of Quezon City, Branch 90. This petition remains pending.


Through these maneuvers, Maynilad unduly prolonged the non-payment of

concession fees, as well as prevented the drawing on the US$120 M

performance bond it put up to secure its obligations. The legal

obstacle to the drawing on the bond was removed only when the Supreme

Court, on 21 June 2004, declared null and void an order by the

rehabilitation court enjoining the MWSS from proceeding against the

performance bond.


On the part of the MWSS, what appeared to be an honest attempt to

legally defend its interest at some point started going the opposite

direction. In spite of the opposition to the petition for

rehabilitation that it filed in the rehabilitation court, the MWSS, as

the presidential elections drew near, entered into a compromise

agreement with Maynilad that can only be characterized as a shameless

bailout of Maynilad’s sponsors. This compromise, contained in the

infamous “Amendment No. 2 to the Concession Agreement”, limits the MWSS

drawing to only US$50 M when US$120 M was available, and converts the

remaining accrued and unpaid concession fees into equity in Maynilad,

effectively buying virtually worthless shares. The sponsors are

released from their guarantees to the performance bond.


After the elections, the tide somehow changed again. After the Supreme

Court ruling came out, the National Economic and Development Authority

(NEDA) did not give its endorsement of the compromise agreement, and

the MWSS promptly manifested before the rehabilitation court that it is

withdrawing its concurrence to Amendment No. 2. After a new round of

negotiations, Maynilad, on 9 September 2004, submitted a revised

rehabilitation plan that addressed many of the defects of Amendment No.

2. Specifically, the new rehabilitation plan assumes that there will be

a full draw of the US$120 M bond, and MWSS does not convert any

remaining unpaid concession fees to equity.


Still, it remains doubtful whether the policy of accommodation has

completely stopped. For one, until now there is no indication that MWSS

Administrator Orlando C. Honrade has implemented a board resolution

directing him to draw on the bond for the full amount on or before 30

July 2004, under pain of administrative charges for gross negligence of

duty should the directive not be implemented. For another, it is the

consumers that bear the brunt of the rehabilitation through increased

water rates, even as Benpres walks away with a release from its

guarantees.


At a time when it has admitted a fiscal crisis, the Arroyo

administration must be able to convincingly show that it has abandoned

its policy of accommodation of vested interests, if it is to gain

credibility in leading a policy regime of fiscal recovery. Maynilad is

an important test case. In addition to immediately drawing on the

performance bond for the full amount, MWSS should seriously consider

other remedies available to it outside of the rehabilitation case in

order to stop its financial hemorrhage. One alternative is the exercise

of its right under the concession agreement to initiate early

termination procedures. MWSS itself is of the position that the

Petition for Rehabilitation filed by Maynilad constitutes a

concessionaire event of termination.


The tentativeness of MWSS in protecting its interest is intolerable.

The fiscal problem hangs in the balance. The situation calls for

decisive action, now.

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