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Action for Economic Reforms

CANCUN LOSERS: POOR COUNTRIES

The author is a Research Associate at the Philippine Institute for

Development Studies, and a PhD candidate at the UP School of Economics.


The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only international body that

regulates trade between nations. A multilateral trading system that is

based on rules, its primary objective is to achieve freer trade by

ensuring that trade flows as smoothly and predictably as possible

through the opening up of markets.


WTO’s top level decision-making body, the Ministerial Conference, had

its fifth meeting in Cancun, Mexico last September. After almost two

years of stagnation in trade talks, the meeting was held to take stock

of progress in the negotiations and provide other necessary work.

Unfortunately, too much grandstanding, excessive politicization, and

less efforts to seek the necessary compromises to reach a consensus led

to the collapse of the trade talks.


There are three major controversial issues that divided developed and

developing countries: removal of agricultural subsidies, tariff

reduction on industrial goods, and the so-called “Singapore issues,”

which were heavily pushed by Japan and the European Union and greatly

opposed by developing countries.


These issues consisted of investment policy, competition policy,

procedures for transparency in government procurement, and

trade-facilitating policies such as customs procedures.


In both agriculture and industrial products, the main issue revolved on

how to reduce trade barriers, how much the developed countries should

give and how little developing countries should give up. The US and the

EU drew up a framework to free agricultural trade but this was refused

by the G20+ countries. The G20+ is a new bloc of developing countries

led by Brazil, China, and India that coalesced before the Cancun

meeting to counter US and EU agricultural protectionism. They demanded

rich countries to cut their subsidies and free agricultural trade more

and poor countries to offer much less liberalization.


In 2001, OECD countries spent $311 billion to support their

agricultural sectors. The US provides $3 billion subsidies to its

farmers leading to a drop in the world price of cotton and hurting more

efficient African producers. Note that developing countries’

agricultural sectors are also highly protected, not through subsidies,

which are unaffordable to them, but through very high tariffs.


While the overall tariffs on industrial goods applied by developed

countries are already low, their tariffs remain high in labor-intensive

products like textiles and other manufactures that are of interest to

developing countries. Rich countries are willing to liberalize these

sectors but they want the advanced developing countries to do the same.


However, most developing countries refuse to expose their industries to

more international competition. Countries like Brazil, which have huge

agricultural sector, would not even discuss industrial goods until

clear gains in agriculture are seen. This hardening and seemingly tough

and uncompromising position complicated the whole decision-making

process in Cancun. With the participants taking too much time to reveal

their true positions, the more it became very difficult to achieve

compromises.


The ministers could not agree on any of the Singapore issues. The

developing countries rejected all four issues outright on the ground

that no concessions should be made unless developed countries would

concede to their demands in agriculture. It is true that developing

countries have limited knowledge and little negotiating capacity in

terms of investment and competition policy. But there are gains for

both developed and developing countries from reforms in trade

facilitation as well as government procurement that would have

addressed issues like transparency, corruption, and reduction of

transaction costs of doing business with the government. In the end,

the EU was willing to forego competition and investment, although this

was deemed too late because by then, tough stances were already adopted

and nobody wanted to yield.


With the Cancun breakdown, anti-globalization groups and NGOs were

extremely delighted. Our own trade minister and chief negotiator was

elated by it. It is ironic how we could rejoice in the fact that with

the collapse of the trade talks, every country would suffer with some

having to suffer more than others. The developed countries have less to

lose, they have the resources and they can always engage in bilateral

and regional agreements where they can easily flex their economic

muscles. The real losers are the developing countries especially the

smaller and weaker ones.


Our negotiators should go beyond the rhetoric that no deal is better

than a bad deal, an all or nothing position, and the political victory

of G20+. After Cancun, there is a need to reflect on important issues

like have we made up our minds on what we really want to achieve and

what our country’s interests are. Have we made cost-benefit assessment

of our negotiating positions on market access not only for agriculture

but also for industrial goods that are of interest to us notably

textiles and clothing, footwear, leather and fish products where

developed countries’ tariffs are still high. Did we assess the

individual WTO issues and their ramifications on the Philippine

economy? Who in our economy would benefit and who would lose and by how

much? Did we forge correct alliances or did we just follow herd

mentality? Our negotiators should not focus solely on the effect of

freer trade on Filipino producers of like goods, but rather should

focus on national economic interest, i.e., the sum of all benefits to

all Filipinos who gain less the costs to all Filipinos who lose.


While regionalism and bilateralism are fast becoming an obsession at

the moment, a multilateral system based on rules is still superior.


There’s always the danger that regionalism might give rise to

substantial trade diversion while under bilateralism, small countries

have hardly any say and concessions can easily be withdrawn. Despite

its weaknesses, the WTO still provides the best solution.


A Geneva meeting was scheduled in December 2003 to revive the talks. To

get back on track, much depends not only on powerful countries like the

US and the EU but on the cooperation of weaker countries as well

recognizing that they have the most to lose if the talks collapse.


Countries should commit to more meaningful reforms. The US and the EU

should go beyond their earlier proposal on agriculture subsidies while

advanced developing countries should pursue reforms to reduce their own

trade restrictions. Currently, uncertainty still looms as the US 2004

election and the EU enlargement might dampen their interest in trade

talks.

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