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  • Action for Economic Reforms

BACKSLIDING IN TARIFF POLICY

Dr. Erlinda Medalla is a Research Fellow in the Philippine Institute of Development Studies. Ms. Rafaelita Aldaba is a Supv. Research Specialist at the same institution.


The last 10 to 20 years have witnessed widespread trade liberalization

in the Philippines. While the trade reforms initiated in the 1980s were

not sustained, the reforms in the 1990s were carried out with much

vigor. Following liberalization, average tariffs dropped from over 40%

in 1980 to 8% in 2000 and will have fallen to 4-5% in 2004.


Agricultural tariffs are higher than for manufactures and sensitive

agricultural products are protected by tariff quotas.


The trade reforms resulted in changes in the country’s output structure

and export orientation. In the manufacturing industry, there is a shift

from consumer goods like food processing and beverages towards

intermediate goods like chemicals and petroleum refineries. Capital

goods rise due to the growing importance of electrical machinery and

professional and scientific equipment. In terms of export orientation,

the share of manufactured goods to total exports increased from 25% in

1981-85 to 90% in 1996-01.


Despite these improvements in trade and overall domestic resource

allocation, many are concerned about the subdued effects of the reforms

on the domestic economy. Doubts are raised noting the slow growth of

manufacturing value added vis-a-vis the fast growth in manufactured

exports. One potential explanation for the lackluster growth in

manufacturing is our continued dependence of manufactured exports on

imported inputs and lack of backward linkages with domestic output. But

while manufacturing value added declined continuously during the 1980s,

there are signs of gradual improvement in the 1990s as the share of

manufacturing increased from 21% in 1990 to 24% in 2000.


Another source of concern is the lack of growth in total factor

productivity. This poor performance has been attributed to both adverse

domestic and international shocks that hit the country as well as the

adjustment lags that have accompanied our trade reforms. In the more

recent period 1996-2001, however, some small positive contribution in

factor productivity has been observed. It remains to be seen whether

this gain could be sustained.


The transition from a highly distorted trade regime to a more liberal

one is a long and difficult process. By reducing protection, trade

liberalization lowers domestic prices and forces high cost firms either

to trim their fat or exit the market. Firms adjust by moving labor and

capital; one-time adjustment costs are incurred in terms of worker

retraining, machinery, unemployment, and bankruptcy. More often,

however, powerful domestic producers put up a strong resistance. They

engage in cartel and lobbying activities for the government to reimpose

protectionist measures particularly when they are unable to adapt

quickly to new market conditions and find themselves vulnerable to

competition from more efficient foreign producers. As a result, tariff

distortions that are supposed to be corrected by trade reforms still

persist. For instance, the petrochemicals sector, a major input to a

lot of industries, receives a tariff of 15% while finished goods only

receive between 5-10% tariff protection. In the cement sector, firms

that operated like a cartel are able to receive additional protection

against competing imports.


In light of these conditions, it becomes very difficult to sustain

trade reforms. Given our weak institutional and regulatory framework,

the government simply tends to be inconsistent and soon after, a policy

reversal is apparent. Early this year, the government froze tariffs at

their 2002 levels. Very recently, it announced that tariff rates would

be increased to their 1998 applied levels to strengthen domestic

industries. Clearly, this is an indication that in response to

pressures, the government has reversed its trade policy.


Indeed, there may be some valid reasons, particularly social concerns

for temporary protection to preserve employment. It should be

emphasized, however, that substantial care must be taken in identifying

domestic industries where competition from imports has been too fierce

to allow the transition process to be socially sustainable. Protection

could be awarded as long as import growth is the cause of serious

injury to domestic import-competing industries. It must also be

temporary and strictly related to a restructuring program.


Note that the preservation of jobs as a social policy often results in

tremendous costs to consumers. A tariff artificially increases prices,

reduces imports and increases domestic production, but leads to a

decline in consumption. It may also affect the competitiveness of the

export industries. If the costs are disproportionate relative to the

expected benefits, then the social policy embodied in protectionism

should be addressed in a more efficient manner. For example, through

direct government assistance to individuals who lose their jobs as

imports increase or tax relief to firms that are less efficient than

foreign competitors.


Allowing backsliding and the continuous use of protection dampen firms’

incentives to become efficient and foster rent-seeking behavior.

Backsliding substantially reduces the credibility of trade reforms.

Dani Rodrik points out that a primary need for a government engaged in

trade liberalization is to establish and bolster its credibility.


Allowing the possibility of providing protection amidst the transition

process sends a signal to firms that the government will not commit

itself to a given policy reform. This can negatively affect the

performance of firms and can lead to so-called time-inconsistency

problems. The firms do not adjust because they expect to obtain further

protection in the future and it may not be politically optimal for the

government not to grant such protection.


Reversing tariff reform at this time when firms have already started to

respond to reforms will create a lot of uncertainty and instability

that can easily swamp the gains earned from previous reforms and thus,

can do more harm than good. Particularly damaging are high inflation

and low growth. Increasing tariff rates will lead to a large degree of

variability in relative prices that goes hand in hand with high

inflation. With low growth, the firms’ ability to adjust to changes in

relative prices diminishes. Finally, this could reduce government

credibility that could make investors and lending institutions doubt

government’s commitment to render well-meaning reforms.

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