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Action for Economic Reforms

ANNUAL COST OF CURRENT RICE PRICE POLICY: P27B

The author is Professor at the School of Government of Ateneo de Manila University. He is former undersecretary for policy and planning, Department of Agriculture, 1986-1992


The intentions of current rice price policies in the Philippines are eminently laudable. But there is a vast gulf between policy intentions and actual effects.


For the past 30 years, the National Food Authority (NFA) has implemented the country’s rice price strategy – one often described as: “Buy high, store long, sell low.”

Per Presidential Decree 4 (1972), only NFA may import or export rice.

Given this monopoly, the NFA builds up rice stocks by importing milled

rice or procuring paddy (unhusked rice or palay) from local farmers.


Government Monopoly


The intention of the NFA monopoly is to maintain control of the

domestic rice market, believing that government control is necessary to

“stabilize” domestic prices, to ensure that Filipino farmers and

consumers are protected from the so-called “volatile” world market.

Private Filipino entities may participate in international rice trade

if they have NFA’s permission. NFA permits are rarely provided, and

usually only for limited quantities of specialized rice.


Under the monopoly, the volume of rice trade is subject to quantitative

restrictions (QRs) or quotas. These QRs are set administratively by an

interagency committee (IAC) chaired by the Department of Agriculture

(DA). The IAC recommends trade volumes to the DA secretary and NFA

administrator.


Prices and price differentials between domestic and world prices do not

enter into the IAC’s analysis of the rice QR. Since the IAC’s decision

making is administrative in nature, it is constrained by the

bureaucracy’s ills: corruption, politics and delay.


Delay happens often in NFA’s trade decisions. From 1971 to 1998, NFA

imported an average of 730,000 metric tons (MT) of rice per year. Of

all imports, some 31% arrived during the harvest season, resulting in

further lowered farmgate prices!


Philippine rice prices have behaved more erratically than world prices.


NFA Price


NFA sets its paddy procurement price at higher than market, intending

to support farmgate prices at above-market level. The procurement price

is set based on average production costs and is the same country-wide,

regardless of isolation, marketing, supply or demand conditions.


The current NFA procurement price is P9/kilogram (kg) in the wet/ main

harvest season (September-February) and P10/kg in the dry/ minor

harvest/lean season (March-August). Over the second semester of 2001,

the open market farmgate price of paddy was P8.21/ kg.


Over the 1990s, the NFA procured only an average of 2.8% of total

annual paddy produced – about 300,000 MT. Given such a small volume,

only about 67,000 farmers (or 3% of all two million rice farmers) have

directly benefited from procurement. In 2000, a survey of the Bureau of

Agricultural Statistics asked farming households if they have ever sold

their rice directly to NFA, and only 12% replied “Yes.”


NFA Borrowing


NFA borrows from commercial banks at commercial rates to finance its operations.

The Department of Finance has authorized the NFA to borrow up to P20.1 billion under a sovereign government guarantee.


Bank loans to NFA are deemed by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas as

compliant with PD 717 – the Agri-Agra Loan Quota Law (which mandates

banks to direct at least 25% of loans to agriculture and agrarian

reform beneficiaries).


In1995-2001, NFA annually imported an average of 885,000 MT of rice. In

paddy terms the NFA imported four times the volume bought from local

farmers. NFA profits from imports, but loses from local procurement. At

current world rice prices, the landed price of rice imported by NFA

into Manila is P9-P10/kg and NFA makes P3-P4/kg. On domestic

procurement, NFA loses between P7 and P8/kg of paddy handled.

When the NFA imports rice, the 50% tariff set in the tariff code is not

collected. On the average over 1995-2000, the tariff income forgone by

government resulting from the NFA’s imports has averaged P4 billion.


NFA’s rice inventory target is at least 30 days of consumption, based

on an assumed per capita annual consumption of 103 kgs. The NFA’s stock

is the sum of imported and domestic rice. NFA’s capacity to influence

consumer prices far exceeds its capacity to support farmgate prices.

Year-round, NFA sells regular milled rice at a single national price of

P13/kg to Targeted Rice Distribution Program outlets and rolling

stores, and P14/kg to traders. NFA’s rice sales are intended to protect

consumers from high rice prices, but a Social Weather Stations survey

found that only 15% of Filipinos avail of NFA rice.


Furthermore, while NFA rice may be priced lower than domestic market

retail, such is still twice or thrice that faced by Thais or

Vietnamese. The average retail price of regular-milled rice in Manila

is currently P20/kg. For the same rice, Vietnamese pay only P6.50/ kg.

while Thais pay P7.60/kg.


The gap between world and Philippine rice prices has continually

widened. Between 1982 and 2000, average world prices of rice fell by

0.6% yearly while Philippine wholesale prices rose by 10.6% yearly.

NFA’s sales hurt farmers. The market uses the NFA release price and

procurement capacity as references. The wholesale price is sensitive to

NFA’s release activities. Rice merchants maintain their trading margins

in response to NFA release and procurement by adjusting their paddy

buying prices.


Costs and Benefits


The AGILE study of 1999 estimated the annual costs and benefits of current rice price policy, including:

  1. Appropriations for NFA procurement = over P1 billion;

  2. NFA commercial borrowing with sovereign guarantees = P2 billion;

  3. Forgone tariff income on NFA imports = P4 billion;

  4. NFA operating costs = 30% of value of domestic procurement or P0.9 billion;

  5. net welfare cost to farmers who could have received higher prices

  6. net


By being linked to rice price policies, the P27 billion used for rice

price subsidies is diverted from the truly significant interventions

for sustainable agricultural growth and food security: irrigation,

seeds, extension and efficient transport.

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