Institutional Reforms and Governance of Capital Controls

This paper discusses efforts to reform the world financial system after
the East Asian financial crisis. It asserts that post-crisis reforms
pushed by the IMF have only led to the reduction of risk and
accountability of the private sector (mostly of the North), and pushed
the burden of market failure to governments and the public in the South
(as illustrated by the debt burden of South Korea, Thailand, and
Indonesia). In many cases, IMF programmes transformed the financial
crisis into wider economic and social crises.

This paper discusses efforts to reform the world financial system after
the East Asian financial crisis. It asserts that post-crisis reforms
pushed by the IMF have only led to the reduction of risk and
accountability of the private sector (mostly of the North), and pushed
the burden of market failure to governments and the public in the South
(as illustrated by the debt burden of South Korea, Thailand, and
Indonesia). In many cases, IMF programmes transformed the financial
crisis into wider economic and social crises.

The paper argues further
that the IMF's posture of reform can be interpreted as its attempt to
regain legitimacy, to disarm its critics, and even co-opt sectors of
civil society. Thus, proposes that there is a need to move away from
the dominant model of economic development, which has led to
subordination of the South within the global structure controlled by
the North.

Read full text (.pdf, 46kb, 8pp)

No comments yet.